Friday, August 9, 2024

The Duar War 1864-65



The Duar War 1864-65

 Immediately, after reaching Darjeeling, Eden submitted his report to the Government on the events that had happened to the members of the Mission at Punakha. On 7th May 1864, Eden also submitted to the Government the measures to be taken to prevent future war with Bhutan.

  • The permanent occupation of the whole country of Bhutan.
  •  The temporary occupation of the country, to be followed by the withdrawal of the occupying force after destroying all the forts and letting the people see and feel our power to reach them at any future time.
  •   The permanent annexation of the that tract at the foot of the hills called the Duars and Jelpesh, which formerly and naturally belonged to Bengal, but which was partly wrested from the Mahomedan rulers of Bengal, and partly ceded by us at the end of last century.
  •    The lowest range of the Bhutan hills at elevations from 2000 to 3500 feet above the Duars would be necessary to take possession and occupy them; incorporate the hill territory with the Duars and make them frontier. He also strongly recommended the annexation of the tract of Bhutan between Darjeeling and Dalimkote.

The British Government in India initially appears to take action leniently on Bhutanese and wanted to permanently annex Ambaree Fallakota and withhold the annual compensation for the Assam Duars. However, a demand was made to Bhutan Government that Bhutan should surrender all British India, Sikkim and Cooch Behar subjects held in captivity. British India would attack the Bengal Duars, if Bhutan failed to surrender the above mentioned captives.

A sufficient time was given to the Bhutanese Government to response and complies with the demand made by British India.  There was no response from the Bhutanese Government. Therefore, preparations for the war were going on. British India planned to attack Bhutanese frontiers on Dalingkha in the west to Dewangiri in the East.  The other frontiers in the middle of the two extreme frontiers are Chamooche, Balla, Buxa and Bishensigh.

On hearing the news that British Indian Government was fully prepared for the war against Bhutan, then Bhutanese Government sent a letter to Chebu Lama of Sikkim through the Dzongpon of Dalingkha.  The following is the translation of the contents of the letter:

“The British say you were interpreter to the mission, we do not know what you said and Eden did not know what we said, but you know whether the treaty was not agreed to. We used no force, if we had, it should have been mentioned at the time, and you should not have afterwards allowed Eden on his return to deceive the Governor General and lead him to write to the Dharma Raja that we had used violence. Our Bhutan custom is this, that an answer once given is given, and a bargain made is made, so we did not tell the Desi of this. If the treaty made last year is not allowed, if another right dealing person will come, or if a representative is wanted from hence, write so, therefore, we have sent this order to you, but if an attack made upon us is right or wrong, recollect that you are responsible as the go-between. We cannot make restitution of anything now. The low country is unhealthy also, and an envoy could not be sent; when the sickness is less send for one. The case as regards robbery and theft is as follows:

In the Cooch Behar territory and ours, the faults are equal-besides the English Government ha staken seven Talooks of the Dangsi Terai(the Assam duars), an dthe rent of Ambaree Fallakata has been withheld for some years. These are causes for our declaring war, instead of which the British Governmentare doing it. Make them do right. If we can withstand them we will, if not we will remain passive. Now you are the originator of confusion, you are a Sikkimese and we shall have something to say to you; remember this and say it to the English Authorities. Well, if there is no confusion between the British and the Dharma Raja, there will be nothing to say between us. If you do make mischief it will not harm us. Having considered all this, send your answer through the Dzongpon of Dalingkha”.

The British Plan of attack Bhutanese Frontiers[1]

 The military authorities were informed by the British India Government that the forces were required to operate in Bhutan on 24th August 1864. Further the military authorities were directed to make plan of operations to attack Bhutan. The Bengal Government wanted to annex the duars from Daling to Dewangiri and not to invade the whole country. So, the Government believed that one regiment would be sufficient to seize and hold the all the eighteen duars.[2] But Sir Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief, on 8th September 1864, stated that a larger detached column is required as the Bhutan is a mountainous country drained by large rivers and swamps. The Commander-in-Chief anticipated that the chief dangers to be guarded against were that the Bhutanese might induce the Tibetans and other tribes to join them. Therefore, he recommended that four columns should be formed to attack on Dewangiri, Sidli, Buxa, and Dalingkha.[3]

As a result, the military was divided into four columns. The soldiers of the right column would attack Dewangiri from Gauhati. British’s aim was to distract attention of Bhutanese and make Bhutanese to divide the forces and the other aim was to protect their right flank from any attack from the Abors and Mechs. This shows that British did not expect such strong reaction from Bhutanese. The soldiers of the right centre column would march towards Bishensigh from Goapara. Here also British did not expect any opposition from Bhutanese.  While the soldiers of the left column would attack Dalingkha and Chamuchi from Jaipalguri, this column should protect any attack from Sikkim and Tibet. The soldiers of the left centre would attack Balla and Buxa from Cooch Behar. British considered the column is the strongest among all the four columns and expected strong fight from Bhutanese forces.

On 4th September 1864, the Government of India approved the above measures. The inhabitants of the duars were asked to remain quite and provide helps to British. In return, British promised that they would protect the life and properties of people.

Hugh Rose, sitting third from left, with John Lawrence, Viceroy of India and other council members. c. 1864

 Instructions were also issued that no overtures from the Bhutan Government were to be taken into considerations except upon the following basis:[4]

  • That the Bhutan Government surrender all the Bengal Duars and the hill territory on the left bank of the Tista river;
  • That the Bhutan Government give up the two documents extorted from from Mr. Eden and send a chief of rank to apologise for the misconduct towards the envoy;
  •  The surrender of all captives still detained in Bhutan against their will;
  • That the Bhutan Government enters into a treaty of friendship and fair dealing for the future.

British India Government had the following field forces during the Bhutan Duar war in 1864-65:

Right Column (Dewangiri)

Three Mountain Guns of Eurasian Artillery Company

One Squadron 5th Bengal Cavalry

3rd Assam Light Infantry

One Coy Sibundy Sappers

One Coy Bengal Sappers

In support at Gauhati

Three Coys 12th Native Infantry

Assam Local Artillery

Right Centre Column (Bishensigh)

Three Mountain Guns of Eurasian Artillery Company

One Squadron 5th Bengal Cavalry

Two Squadrons 14th Bengal Cavalry

One Coy Sibundy Sappers

Half Coy Bengal Sappers and Miners

One wing 44th Assam Light Infantry

In support at Goalpara

Two Coys 12th Native Infantry

Left Centre Column (Buxa)

Half Armstrong Mountain Train Battery

Two 8-inch Mortars

2nd Gurkhas

11th Native Infantry

One Squadron 14th Bengal Cavalry

Left Column (Daling)

Two Armstrong Mountain Guns

Two 8-inch Mortars

One Coy Sibundy Sappers

One Wing 11th Native Infantry

Two Squadrons 5th Bengal Cavalry

In support at Jalpaiguri

Seven Coys HM 80th Foot

Source: (https://wiki.fibis.org/w/Duar_War)

Brigadier General Mulcaster was appointed to command the Duar Field force and Brigadier General Dunsford to command the two left columns under the Brigadier General Mulcaster’s direction. The Commander-in-Chief also recommended that two civil officers should accompany the columns in order to gain a thorough acquaintance with the country. Accordingly, Lieutenant- Colonel Haughton was appointed Chief Civil and Political Officer, Captain Lance and Mr. Donoghue were posted to the left columns, and Mr. Metcalf and Mr. Dribeng to the right.

The military preparations were completed by the end of November 18964 and force was ready to take the field. The plan was to attack all the four Bhutanese frontiers at the same time but did not. The right column could start only after some days while right centre column some weeks due some transportation problems.

In early November 1864, the military preparations for the annexation of the Bengal Duars and the capture of the Forts in the lower range of hill were completed. The following proclamation was issued by the Governor General to the Bhutan Government.

Proclamation of War 1864

For many years past outrages have been committed by subjects of the Bhutan Government within British territory, and in the territories of the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar. In these outrages property has been plundered and destroyed, lives have been taken, and many innocent persons have been carried into and are still held in captivity.

The British Government, ever sincerely desirous of maintaining friendly relations with neighboring States, and specially mindful of the obligations imposed on it by the treaty of 1774, has endeavored from time to time by conciliatory remonstrance to induce the Government of Bhutan to punish the perpetrators of these crimes, to restore the plundered property, and to liberate the captives.

But such remonstrances have never been successful, and, even when followed by serious warning, have failed to produce any satisfactory result. The British Government has been frequently deceived by vague assurances and promises for the future, but no property has ever been restored, no captive liberated, no

offender punished, and the outrages have continued.

In 1863 the Government of India, being averse to the adoption of extreme measures for the protection of its subjects and dependent allies, dispatched a special mission to the Bhutan Court, charged with proposals of a conciliatory character, but instructed to demand the surrender of all captives, the restoration of plundered property, and security or the future peace of the frontier. This pacific overture was insolently rejected by the Government of Bhutan- Not only were restitution for the past and security for the future refused, But the British Envoy was insulted in open Darbar and compelled, as the only means of ensuring the safe return of the mission, to sign a document which the Government of India could only instantly repudiate.

For this insult, the Governor Genera1 in Council determined to withhold forever the annual payments previously made to the Bhutan Government on account of the revenues of the Assam Dooars and Ambaree Fallacottah, which had long been in the occupation of the British Government, and annexed those districts permanently to British territory. At the same time, still anxious to avoid an open rupture, the Governor-General in Council addressed a letter to the Deb and Dhurma Rajah, formerly demanding that all captives detained in Bhutan against their mill should be released and that all property carried off during the last five years should be restored.

To this demand the Government of Bhootan has returned an evasive reply, from which can be gathered no hope that the just requisitions of the Governmentt of India will ever be complied with, or that the security of the frontier can be provided for otherwise than by depriving the Government of Bhootan and its subjects of the means and opportunity of future aggression.

The Governor-General in Council as therefore reluctantly resolved to occupy permanentlv and annex to British territory the Bengal Dooars of Bhootan, and so much of the Hill territory, including the Forts of Dalimkote  Punakha and Dewangiri, as may be necessary to command the passes, and to prevent hostile or predator incursions of Bhootanese into the Darjeeling districts or into the plains below. A Military Force amply sufficient to occupy this tract and to overcome all resistance has been assembled on the frontier, and will now proceed to carry out this resolve.

All Chiefs, Zamindars, Munduls, Ryots, and other inhabitants of the tract in question are hereby required to submit to the authority of the British Government, to remain quietly in their homes, and to render assistance to the British troops and to the Commissioner who is charged with the administration of the tract. Protection of life and property and a guarantee of all private rights is offered to those who do not resist, and strict justice will be done to all. The lands will be moderately assessed, and all oppression and extortion will be absolutely

prohibited. The future boundary between the territories of the Queen of England and those of Bhootan will be surveyed and marked off, and the authority of the Government of Bhootan within this boundary will cease forever.

 

By order of the Governor-General in Council 

Fort William,                                                               H. M. Durand, Colonel,

The 12th November 1864.                                          Secy. to the Government of India

 Operations of the two Left Columns:               

On 28th November 1864, an advanced party of the Daling Column, under Major Gough, V.C. and Major Pughe marched from Jalpaiguri to Bakali where a small outpost of Bhutanese called Gopalgan was taken without any resistance. On 29th November 1864, they marched to Maynaguri where the Bhutanese stockade was found empty. On 30th November, Major Gough’s team went to Domohani and found that a small stockade was deserted by Bhutanese soldiers.

On 1st December, Brigadier General Dunsford’s column came to Domohani and halted a day there. On 3rd December the column proceeded to Kyranti and on 4th, the column reached near the pass leading to Dalingkha. On 5th December the column marched towards Ambiokh, the village below the Daling Dzong. On the 6th morning, British Indian forces moved and attacked the Daling Dzong by guns and mortars from Ambiokh. They were climbing up the steep slope towards the Dzong of Daling where they received stones and arrows and two men were killed including the officers. At last they could capture the Dzong of Daling but the victory did not come ease. On 10th December, the Dhamsang Dzong was also captured without resistance from Bhutanese.

Brigadier General Dunsford kept a garrison at Dalingkha and moved down to the plains to march towards Chamurchi next. On 29th December, an advance team was sent to examine the position of the Chamurchi and to occupy it if it was undefended. Here, they were attacked by the Bhutanese and twelve men were wounded. On 31st December, Brigadier General Dunsford came with the main column and took the position and on the 1st January 1865 British forces attacked the Dzong by shelling. The Bhutanese soldiers immediately evacuated the Dzong. In the ensuing battle thirteen Bhutanese soldiers were killed and while two of British Indian men killed and three wounded.

After keeping 100 men at Chamurchi, Brigadier General Dunsford proceeded to Balla and Buxa to inspect the posts there with fifty men on 2nd January 1865. The British forces at Balla and Buxa column were commanded by Colonel Watson. From Cooch Behar, Colonel Watson marched on 28th November to Chicha kota. On reaching Chicha kota, they found the place was abandoned by Bhutanese.  The main column moved further and on 7th December, took possession of Buxa without resistance. From Buxa, the column returned to the plains and then marched westward and had occupied the Balla pass.

 The Operations of the two Right Columns:        

On 2nd December 1864, the soldiers of the right column moved from Goahati under the command of Colonel Campbell who was accompanied by Brigadier General Mulcaster and on 3rd the column reached at Kumrikatta where a standing camp was established. On 7th December, an advance party of fifty Bengal Police was sent to Dewangiri under Captain Macdonald. On 9th they marched to Darranga pass. On the morning of the 10th, when they were about to enter the hills of Dewangiri, they were attacked by a Bhutanese man from a stockade and one British soldier wounded. It was found that there were fifty Bhutanese men behind the Stockade. After halting the previous night at plain, on the morning of the 11th December, the British soldiers advanced to Dewangiri but found that the Stockade was deserted by Bhutanese soldiers.

Captain Macdonald and his men managed to reach at Dewangiri. He stopped near the temple. He anticipated that the place would give up without resistance. He moved further and came across a stone house. In a moment, he received a volley of arrows and stones. One of his men wounded from a single jingal shot. Captain Macdonald took up a position and then he saw a Bhutanese man rushing towards him with spear. The Bhutanese man was shot dead by the policeman. On storming the house by the Captain Macdonald and his men, Bhutanese retired (Rennie).

When Brigadier General Mulcaster was on the process of marching towards Dewangiri, a message was received from Captain Macdonald that he had captured the Dewangiri on the previous night. Therefore, Brigadier General Mulcaster pushed towards Dewangiri with three companies. On his arrival at the Dewangiri, he found that the Dzongpon of Dewangiri and his men left the Dewangiri to Shalikhar Dzong. The rest of the column came to Dewangiri on 12th December 1864. 

On 17th December, the column was divided. They kept six companies of the 43rd, and half No. 9 Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, with two mountain howitzers and fifty 6-pounder rockets as a garrison. The rest of the column returned to Kumrikatta. On 26th December, Brigadier General Mulcaster left Dewangiri to join the Colonel Richardson who was commanding the right left centre from Goalpara to Bishensigh. On 29th December, Brigadier General Mulcaster arrived at Sidlee. Then the column marched towards Bishensingh which was forty-two miles distant. On 5th January 1865, the column approached towards the Bishensingh and on 8th January, the column finally reached at Bishensingh.

Brigadier General Mulcaster went on ahead with three hundred men of the 12th and 44th regiments of Native Infantry to storm on the Fort of Bishensigh. But on his arrival at the fort, he found the only single stone house which was occupied by an old lama. The fort at Bishensigh seemed to use by the Wangdi Dzongpon as a temporary residence when he came down for short winter.

The storming was over. Like in Dewangiri, the force was breaking up. The three companies of the 44th Native Infantry and fifty of the Bengal Police were kept as garrison here at Bishensigh. The two squadrons of the 5th Bengal Cavalry sent to Jalpaiguri and the rest returned to Sidlee. Then Brigadier General Mulcaster left to Guahati.

 The Bhutanese Preparations for War

The British thought that war was over then and they were on the process of breaking up the force, the Bhutanese were preparing for the war. Bhutanese determined to attack all British frontiers right from the Dewangiri in the east to Chamurchi in the west. Enough warnings were given by the Bhutanese to British but British did not pay attention and took lightly.

Meanwhile, Bhutanese Government sent Kalyon to Buxa region and Paro Penlop, and Zhung Dronyer to Tazagong (Balla). But MacGregor wrote that Thimphu Dzongpon, Daga Penlop, and Zhung Dronyer were also sent to Buxa Duar. The strength of the force was estimated at round 1200 men. MacGregor further wrote that Paro Penlop, Punakha Dzongpon, Deb Zimpon and Lamai zimpon were sent to Tazagong (Balla). The strength of the force was estimated at round 2050 men.

In the east, Trongsa Ponlop led the Bhutanese forces assisted by Jakar Penlop, Trashigang Dzongpon, Trashi Yangtse Dzongpon, Lhuntse Dzongpon, Zhongar Dzongpon etc. In contrary to MacGregor, Bhutanese source mentioned that Lamai Zimpon accompanied Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal in the Dewangiri region. Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal left Trongsa after offering Solkha (propitiation) to the Gonkhhang of the Trongsa Dzong. On the arrival at Yongla Gonpa, Penlop Jigme Namgyal also offered solkha to the Gonkhang of Yongla Gonpa and he marched down to Dewangiri. They camped in a forest away from the place which was captured by the British force. [5]

On 30th January 1865 morning at five o’clock, Bhutanese soldiers crept into the camp at Dewangiri, and cut the tent ropes. Then the attack became general after sometimes. But the British troops defended their camp and able to keep away the Bhutanese force till the dawn. The Bhutanese force was led by the Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal himself in person. The British casualties included the dead of Lieutenant Urquhart and four men, and Lieutenant Storey,

43rd Native Infantry and thirty-one men wounded.  But Bhutanese loss was estimated about sixty men. The dead of the Jakar Penlop was one of the sixty men.

Over the next three days, British force was continually attacked by the Bhutanese day and night, although they were driven away from the camp. Bhutanese also cut off the water supply to the British camp. On the 3rd February Bhutanese threw up a stockade near the camp and during the night took the possession of the Darranga pass, thereby blocking communications with the plains.

British troops were then getting short of water. They felt that the available force at the camp was not able to dislodge the enemy. Therefore, they asked for the reinforcement on 30th January. But Brigadier General Mulcaster from Gauhati denied saying that the force at Dewangiri is enough for its defense. However, a supply of 25,000 rounds of ammunition was sent but it could not reach to Dewangiri as the communication with the plain was blocked by Bhutanese force.

On February 4th, as the water was running short, Colonel Campbell made up his mind to evacuate the place that night, and retreat to the plain by another pass.

To retreat, the following arrangements were made that two hundred and fifty men were told off - to carry and escort the sick and wounded, 50 to carry the two twelve pounder howitzers, and 200 men to form the advance and rear-guards. On 5th February morning at one o’clock Dewangiri was evacuated quietly. Unfortunately, the troops of the main column lost the way and became panic which caused further disorder in their marching. Troops had to leave some wounded behind them and the guns abandoned. They threw the guns in the deep ravine so that Bhutanese do not notice them. However, Bhutanese saw the abandoned guns and fell in the hands of the Trongsa Penlop. Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal took the guns to his seat at Trongsa, which affects the prestige of the British power in India. MacGregor estimated the strength of the Bhutanese force at Dewangiri was about 2500 men.

This episode at Dewangiri wondered the British military officers by the behavior of the Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal. Earlier Eden reported that Jigme Namgyal was arrogant, hard hearted and rude person. But here at Dewangiri, Jigme Namgyal was found to be otherwise. Jigme Namgyal after the evacuation of the war sent a letter to the military camp of British India at Koomrekatta inquiring about the health of the Bhutanese soldiers who had been captured by Britisth and informed the British military officers that British soldiers captured by Bhutanese are in good health. Jigme Namgyal even sent some money to be used for expenses incur while sending him a reply. Jigme Namgyal was a man of tolerable and found to treat the prisoners well. He was kind to the British messengers who had been sent up to him. He fed them well and gave some presents.[6]

Jigme Namgyal had shown such a kind action, when he was helping the Punakha Dzongpon against the Wangdue Phodrang Dzongpon. In the battle, Jigme Namgyal killed Shar Drungpa of the Wangdue Phodrang Dzongpon. But the Thimphu Dzongpon Karma Druggye and Wangdue Dzongpon Sigyal appeared before Jigme Namgyal and requested to pardon them. Jigme Namgyal readily accepted their request and saved their lives.

At Buxa also, Bhutanese force offered tea and drink. Bhutanese force treated kindly a British soldier and allowed to go his own ways.[7]

Bhutanese counter attack at Bishensingh

 While Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal and troops attacked British force at Dewangiri, Bhutanese also made an attack on British in the right centre frontier and left and left centre frontiers also. On 25th January, Bishensingh was attacked by many Bhutanese troops, although the Bhutanese were beaten off. The responsibility to counter attack the British at Bishensingh was given to Wangdi Dzongpon by the Bhutanese Government. But he did not command the Bhutanese troops in person. The British casualty was only two men wounded by Bhutanese arrows. The strength of the Bhutanese force was estimated at 400 men only.  

 Bhutanese counter attack at Buxa

To counter attack the British force at Buxa, Bhutanese Government sent Kalyon.[8] But MacGregor wrote that the Bhutanses force at Buxa was commanded by Thimphu Dzongpon, Daga Penlop, and Zhung Dronyer.

On 3rd February, the officer in command at Buxa Duar captured a Bhutanese spy who informed that large Bhutanese forces would be reaching at Buxa to counter attack the British on the following day. British troops also saw some Bhutanese but they disappeared on firing at them. On the 6th Lieutenant Gregory with 150 Gurkhas proceeded to attack a stockade which the Bhutanese force had built during the previous night. But the troops not able to storm the stockade had to return with the dead of two officers and thirteen men wounded by the bullets from the matchlock guns of the Bhutanese.  However, the Bhutanese were driven away a few distances from their post on 9th. By 11th January, the Buxa Duar became a safer place for the British troops.

 Bhutanese Counter attack at Balla (Tazigang)

British had garrisoned about fifty men of the 11th Native Infantry at Balla (Tazigang) earlier. On 27th morning, Bhutanese forces attacked them. Bhutanese fought with determination and attempted to force their way into the British Stockade. However, they were repulsed by the British troops. During this battle, British lost one man killed with six men wounded. Bhutanese casualty was not known.

On 4th February, Colonel Watson came with reinforcements. The reinforcements included two Armstrong guns and a mortar. British troops attempted to capture the stockade but could not. Then they retired with the dead of two officers and many men wounded.

The Bhutanese forces were commanded by Paro Penlop, Punakha Dzongpon, Deb Zimpon and Lamai Zimpon. But Bhutanese source does not mention Lamai Zimpon. Instead, Lamai Zimpon was sent to Dewangiri with Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal. Zhabdrung Jigme Norbu was born to former Trongsa Penlop Chogyal Tenzin who was brother of Sonam Dendup. Sonam Dendup served as the Zimpon for Zhabdrung Jigme Norbu. Since then people addressed Sonam Dendup as Lamai Zimpon. During this Duar war time, he was retired lamai Zimpon. The strength of the Bhutanese force was estimated at 2050 men.

Bhutanese Counter attack at Chamurchi

Simultaneously, Bhutanese forces also made a counter attack at Chamurchi frontier. Earlier, British kept s a detachment of 150 of the Bengal Police. Bhutanese forces took up strong position behind the stone wall. Major Pughe who commanded the Bengal Police force found that he could not dislodge the Bhutanese forces. Then he asked reinforcements from Brigadier General Dunsford. He received about 150 of the 30th Punjabees and two mortars commanded by captain Huxham. They attacked Bhutanese and had driven away to the Plain. Once again, Bengal Police took hold of their earlier position whereas the Bhutanese confined themselves to their own entrenchment.

The Bhutanese force at Chamurchi was commanded by Sombekha Dzongpon. The strength of the Bhutanese force was estimated at about 150 men.[9]

 British changed the Commanders of the Duar Field Force

When the news of defeat of British forces at Dewangiri and Balla reached Calcutta, immediate preparations were made to regain their prestige and also to strengthen the remaining posts which were their control.

The following reinforcement were made and dispatched to the north east frontiers:

  • Two batteries Artillery.
  • H. M.'s 55th Regiment.
  • Hd. -Qrs. H. M.’s 80th Regiment.
  •  19th Punjab Infantry.
  • 29th Punjab Infantry
  •  31st Punjab Infantry      

The total strength of the British force in the north east would be 1,300 British Infantry, 2,000 Native Infantry, and 100 artillerymen, in addition to the already large force in the Duars.

Meanwhile, the previous Commanders   Brigadier General Mulcaster and Brigadier General Dunsford were replaced by Brigadier General Frazer Tytler, C. B., and Brigadier General Tombs C.B., V.C. Brigadier General Tombs C.B., V.C. was appointed to replace the Brigadier General Mulcaster of the Right column and Brigadier General Frazer Tytler, C. B. was appointed in place of Brigadier General Dunsford of the Left column. 

The new reinforcements were allocated as follows:

Left Column (Jalpaiguri to Dalingkha and Chamurchi)

Left Centre Column (Cooch Behar to Buxa and Balla)

Right Centre Column (Goalpara to Bishensigh)

Right Column (Guahati to Dewangiri)

One battery, the left wing, 55th Regiment, the headquarters, 80th Regiment, No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and the 31st Punjab Infantry

the 19th Punjab Infantry

 

One battery, the Head-Quarter, 55th Regiment, and the 29th Punjab .Infantry

the 5th Bengal Cavalry

 

 

the 14th Bengal Cavalry

Two 6 pounder

guns and two 24-pounder howitzers with 300 rounds

 

 

 

Brigadier General Frazer Tytler, C. B.

Brigadier General Tombs C.B., V.C

 Unlike in the past, the whole force was divided into two independent commands. The right brigade was under the Brigadier General Tombs C.B., V.C. and the left brigade under the Brigadier General Frazer Tytler, C. B.

On 7th March, General Tombs arrived at Guahati. From Guahati, he went on to Kurnrikatta camp to make the preparations to attack Dewangiri. On 10th March, the British force at Bishensigh was ordered to return to Guahati carefully. General Tombs reported to Quartermaster-General that Bhutanese should be blockaded at their hills. To do this, a force of 400 infantry and 50 mounted police should be set up to carry out patrolling along the Bhutanese foot hills. On 29th March, the following troops were collected at Kurnrikatta camp: 

  • No. 3 Battery, 26th Brigade, Royal Artillery.
  • Eurasian Battery of Miery.
  •  Head-quarters and right wing 66th Foot.
  • No. 7 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
  •  12th Regiment, Native Infantry.
  • 29th   Regiment, Native Infantry
  • 43rd Regiment, Native Infantry
  • Head-quarters and 5 companies, 44th Native Infantry.
  • 100 Duar Police.

Vigorous preparations were carried out for the recapture of Dewangiri. In order to deceive the Bhutanese forces, General Tombs built a small post at the Shobangkatta pass and kept a garrison consisting of one company of Sappers and Miners, a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, three companies of the 29th Native Infantry, two companies of the 43rd Native Infantry, and a troop of the 14th Bengal Cavalry, under the command of Major Langmore. Major Langmore had to patrol the pass daily.  The Bhutanese forces were deceived well. Growing alarmed, Bhutanese forces came in large numbers in the pass. They built numerous stockades there. While they concentrated in this part of the pass, they left the other passes unguarded.

On 31st March, Major Langmore was recalled but the tents were kept as usual under the charge of two companies of the 43rd Native Infantry. This was done to deceive the Bhutanese forces.

 Dewangiri recaptured by the British

Different opinions were expressed by different British officials with regard to the recapture of the Dewangiri. The agent of the Governor General in North East Frontier, Mr. H. Hopkinson suggested to postpone the recapture of Dewangiri in the coming winter season, while Lieutenant Governor of Bengal favored the immediate recapture of the Dewangiri. The Governor General, Sir John Lawrence also expressed his concern that if they go head with their idea of immediate recapture of Dewangiri, it may affect the troops’ health and troops may not able to accomplish the tasks but the members of Council wanted to go for immediate recapture of the Dewangiri. Then Governor General left the task to Brigadier General Tombs.[10]

Therefore, on 1st April, the British troops advanced towards Dewangiri commanded by Colonel Richardson, whereas General Tombs would join them in the following day. Colonel Richardson’s forces included the following:

  • Eurasian Battery.
  • 1 Company, Bengal Sappers.
  • 1 Company, 56th Foot.
  • 3 Companies, 12th Native Infantry.
  • 3 Companies, 29th Native Infantry
  • 1 company, 43rd Native Infantry
  • 4 Companies, 44th Native Infantry

On the morning of 2nd April, on the arrival of General Tombs, Colonel Hume with the main column reported General Tombs that the rear guards were also well up the pass of the Dewangiri.

On April 3rd General Tombs determined to attack. At 10-30 A.M. the troops were formed up for the attack, and fire was opened from two mortars and two howitzers. The advanced party charged and stormed the position. Some of the Bhutanese troops fled, but about 150 of them barricaded themselves in the large wooden blockhouse determined to fight to the last.

Captain Trevor, Lieutenant Dundas. R.E. and Major Sankey gallantly fought through this small opening. The Bhutanese casualties were about 100 dead and about 40 were found breathing for the last. British made another attack on the house of the Dzongpon of Dewangiri and also on the Shombhangkatta pass. But the Bhutanese troops fled. However, there were some casualties inflicted on the Bhutanese troops. Jakar Ponlop Tsondroe Gyaltshen was killed in the battle.

General Tombs said that the Bhutanese fighting men were about 3000 at Dewangiri. Including all arms, British had 1800 men. During this battle, British lost four officers and about 30 men wounded.

Dewangiri was being completely taken over the British troops, decided to evacuate the place. After destroying all the forts at Dewangiri, they returned to Kumrikatta. The last detachment arrived at Kumrikatta on 6th April. Orders were issued to break the Brigade, after keeping the garrison on important posts. On April 23rd, General Tombs handed over the command of the Right Brigade of the Duar field force to Colonel Richardson.

 The Left Brigade

Now let us switch on to the left brigade of the Duar Filed force. General Frazer Tytler took over the command of the left Brigade on 15th February 1865. Immediatley he began to make through inspections all the posts under his command that included Darjeeling, Dhamsang, Dalingkha, Chumarchi, Balla and Buxa. General Tytler next made a plan to attack Balla where Bhutanese troops were holding the force.

The British troops to attack Balla pass were as follows:

  • A wing of the 18th Regiment of Native Infantry
  • The 19th Punajabees
  • The 30th Punajbees
  • The Armstrong guns and mortars

On the night of March 13th, Captains Perkins and deBourbell, R.E, and Lieutenant Cameron, R.A., were sent to inspect the ways that leads to the Fort. They had marched two and a half miles up the spur and returned without having been discovered.

On 14th March, they gathered on the right bank of the river Torsa hidden themselves from the Bhutanese. The other troops under the command of the Colonel Watson would attack the front of the Bhutanese position. There was no sign of the presence of the Bhutanese force. It seemed that the place was evacuated. Just to make sure if Bhutanese had evacuated or not, Brigade Major MacGregor with a few troops proceeded forward. In a moment, he received a bullet from a fire and his four men injured.

 British attacked on Balla Stockade

The stockade at Balla (Tazigang) was stormed by the British troops and burnt down the stockade. The sepoys of the 18th and 19th were also fought gallantly and drove the Bhutanese out. During this battle, the Bhutanese lost was 46, while three men killed and British lost one officer killed and wounded 19 men.

British attacked Buxa

After the completion of the storming of Balla stockade, the British troops turned to Buxa then. British troops took the possession of the Buxa without opposition from the Bhutanese. This was because the Dzongpon of Buxa who was commanding expressed his willingness to give up the arms. To prove his sincerity, he immediately evacuated the place and burnt the stockades. Thus, Buxa fell in the hands of British with ease.

 British attacked Chamarchi

On the 24th of March, General Tytler marched for Chumarchi. To attack the Chamarchi Fort, British had the following strength of the Forces:

  • two guns
  • one 8-inch and two 64-inch mortars
  • 160 police
  • 420 infantries.


                                                    The battle fields of Duar war

                                                     Note: The routes are not to the scale

Upon reaching at Chamarchi frontier, they shot a few rounds of guns. Then Bhutanese evacuated the stockade at Chamarchi. The Chamarchi also fell into the hands of British without even a slightest opposition.

With the end of the Duar War, General Frazer Tytler took over the Commandership of the Duar field force as the General Tombs returned to Gwalior. Guahati was made the Headquarters of the Duar Field Force.

 British India and Bhutan signed Treaty in 1865

Bhutanese did not show the willingness to sign the treaty British proposed. However, there were frequent correspondences being carried out to negotiate the peace between the two countries. In May 1865, Bhutanese sent Envoys to British India for asking the restoration of the Bhutanese territories annexed by the British India which British Government in India declined.[11]

Then, in the month of June 1865, British India decided to send military expedition to Punakha and Trongsa. They planned to invade Punakha by the British troops of Buxa and the troops of the Dewangiri to attack Trongsa. On June 5, Governor General sent a letter to the Desi of Bhutan informing him that the offer of peace is still open. On 13th July, two Bhutanese retainers of the Desi came to India and presented the letter to Colonel Bruce, which stated that Desi was in favor of signing the peace treaty.[12] However, British could not trust Bhutanese. British had to go ahead with their plan to invade Bhutan. Therefore, Brigadier General Frazer Tytler was promoted to Major General and appointed the supreme commander of the force and Brigadier General W.W. Turner, C. B. was nominated as second command.

Colonel Bruce succeeded Colonel Haughton on 1st November 1865.[13] Colonel Bruce was told to continue the negotiation with the Bhutanese counter part. He was empowered to increase the amount of subsidy from Rs. 25000 to 50000.[14] He was also further instructed to insist the restoration of the two guns and to ensure that the British boundary with Bhutan should be from the Bhutanese hills above the plains.[15] 

British resorted to negotiate the peace with Bhutan diplomatically because the preparations of the military were not ready and moreover the supreme Government at England did not approve the invasions of Punakha and Trongsa.[16]

On 6 November, 1865, British received Bhutanese envoy who informed the British India their acceptance of  the terms of peace laid down by British but expressed the their inability to surrender the two guns as the guns were with Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal.[17]

On 8 November 1865, Bhutanese Desi sent his representative to deliver the copy of the treaty which Eden had signed it at Punakha under the force of the Bhutanese authorities.[18]

When Eden came to Punakha with draft treaty to be signed by Bhutan, Bhutanese authorities objected articles eight and nine. At Sinchula also, Bhutanese representatives objected articles two and nine. But British pressed on Bhutan through persuasion and intimidation. Therefore, Bhutan had no alternatives/options than to agree upon to the British desires. Finally, on 11 November 1865, the treaty was signed at Sinchula.

 The Prevention of Duar War 1865

Was there any possibility of the prevention of the war between British India and Bhutan then? I would say, yes. There were definitely certain ways and means to avert the war. British Indian Government could send the mission to Bhutan, when the situation in Bhutan was improved or normalized. Ashley Eden Mission trekked towards Punakha, although they were not welcomed by the Bhutanese authority. The Mission advanced instead of facing problems of not getting porters and also even in harsh weather. Why did the mission send to Bhutan in a hurry? The ill treatment meted out by the members of the mission would not have occurred, if the situation in Bhutan was normalized and invited by the Bhutanese authority.

Bhutanese government did not realize the defeat by the East India Company in 1772 during the short war. Bhutanese leaders failed to understand the military strength of the British India of that time. In addition, Bhutan could have sent British India a word of apology for the gross mistreatment given to the Ashley Eden and his members in 1864. Bhutanese leaders apologized to British India only at the end of the Duar war after signing the treaty at Sinchula.

But some historians say that the Duar war was the war of prestige for British India. British India was adamant that they should punish Bhutan for the insolent rejection of their mission.

Still some other historians believe otherwise.  British India had a strong and long term desire to make Tibet, British Province. To realize the above goal, British India needed to capture the bordering Nations of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and keep under its control. Therefore, British India made Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan their protectorate.[19] Furen (1984) also expressed the same view that when the British India missions to Lhasa failed, British India changed the strategies. British India first wanted to take control of the neighboring Himalayan countries of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Then British India after securing the strong foothold in the southern borders of Tibet, British India made a force invasion to Lhasa in 1904.

This is exactly what British India did. One reads in history. British India first took control of Nepal and established its agent at Kathmandu. Then British India annexed Sikkim and Sikkim became the protectorate of the British India. After the annexation of Sikkim, British India turned towards Bhutan. Bhutan was also defeated in the war of 1864-65. British India also controlled Bhutan through the treaty of Sinchula.

 British India uses treaty of Sinchula as tool to control Bhutan

British India began to use the treaty as tool to control Bhutan, when Bhutan Government closed the road at Chukha Bridge to foreigners in 1867. British India responded to Bhutan Government by threatening to withhold the annual subsidy amount 50,000/ which British India should pay to Bhutan Government as per the treaty of Sinchula 1865.[20]  

The other occasions or the situations where British India used the provisions of the treaty as a tool to control Bhutan were in 1872-73 at Dewangiri. Dewangiri was   ceded to British India as per the treaty of Sinchula 1865. A Bhutanese Zinggap was found to collect taxes from the people of the area under the command of the Trongsa Ponlop. Once again, the Bengal Government issued warning to the Desi of Bhutan that if the Zinggap continued to collect tax, the Bengal Government would withhold the annual subsidy until a satisfactory explanation was provided by the Bhutanese Government.[21]

In addition to the above mentioned situations, such incident took place in 1880 also at a village called Chunabati near Buxa. According to British India, the slaves of the Bhutan Government escaped from Bhutan and settled at the British Indian territory of the Buxa region. The Bhutanese Government raided and carried off six people. Therefore, British India Government demanded the release of the captives and surrender the raiders. On the other hand, Bhutanese Government claimed that these people committed crimes in Bhutan and ran away to Buxa region. Bhutanese Government considered them as criminals and counter demanded that these people must be extradited to Bhutan. When British Government felt that the Bhutanese Government would not yield to the British Indian Government, they resorted to withholding the annual subsidy and made Bhutanese to submit their requisitions.[22]

British India not only withholds the annual subsidy to Bhutanese Government, they also sometimes deducted some amount from the annual subsidy and sometimes they delayed the payments. For instance, in 1874, a few Bhutanese people committed dacoities in British Indian territory. The British India deducted Rs. 1000/- as the compensation from the annual subsidy.[23]

British India implemented the delay tactics of the annual subsidy payments to Bhutan in 1903-4.

Prior to this period, British India wanted to send their forceful mission to Lhasa. But they were worried that how Bhutan would react to this Anglo-Tibetan conflict. Meanwhile, a rumor was spread that Bhutan would help Tibet and preparation was on the progress. To confirm the Bhutanese stand on the Anglo-Tibetan conflict, British India invited Trongsa Ponlop Ugyen Wangchuck to send his representative for a meeting at Darjeeling. During the meet, British India wanted to inform the Bhutanese about the Bhutanese obligations of the Sinchula Treaty 1865 and asked Bhutanese permission to construct a road from a Bhutanese territory of Amo Chhu valley to Chumbi valley. British India suspecting that Bhutan would not co-operate with the British India requisitions, they delayed the annual subsidy payments to Bhutan. British India paid the annual subsidy to Bhutan only after securing the confirmation of the Bhutan’s mediator role in the Anglo-Tibetan conflict and getting written permission that British India would build roads in the Amo chhu valley of the Bhutanese territory.[24]

 


[1] The main reference for this part of the book are:

·         Bhotan and the story of the Doar war by Rennie

·          FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA COMPILED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH DIVISION OP THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF ARMY HEAD QUARTERS INDIA NORTH AND NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER TRIBES,1907

[2] Lady MacGregor (1988)

[3] INTELLIGENCE BRANCH DIVISION OP THE CHIEF OF THE STAfF ARMY HEAD QUARTERS

INDIA (1907)

[4] Gruning (1911)

[5] Tshewang (1994)

[6] Rennie (1866), Collister (1987)

[7] Collister (1987)

[8] Tshewang (1994)

[9] MacGregor (1866)

[10] Labh (1974)

[11] Labh (1974)

[12] Mujumdar (1984)

[13] Labh (1974)

[14] Mujumdar (1984)

[15] Labh (1974)

[16] Mujumdar (1984)

[17] Mujumdar (1984)

[18] Mujumdar (1984)

[19] Das (1927)

[20] Singh (1988)

[21] Singh (1988), Labh, (1974)

[22] Labh (1974)

[23] Labh (1974)

[24] Singh (1988)


                                                     

Saturday, July 27, 2024

Brief Biography of Geshe Ngawang Kunga Gyamtsho (1702-1776)

 

Brief Biography of Geshe Ngawang Kunga Gyamtsho (1702-1776)

Geshe Ngawang Kunga Gyamtsho, born in Pagar Rilung Gonpa in Bhutan, was a remarkable individual whose talents and contributions left a lasting impact on his community. He was known as Ngawang Dondup in his early years.

From a young age, Geshe displayed exceptional qualities, endearing himself to the elders of the village with his wise words and kind demeanor. His upbringing was filled with love and admiration from all who knew him.

Under the guidance of esteemed teachers such as Jetsun Sang Ngag Gyamtsho and Jetsun Jamyang Gyamtsho, Geshe embarked on a journey of learning that encompassed a wide range of subjects, from grammar to philosophy. His dedication and hard work culminated in the successful completion of his studies.

One of Geshe's notable achievements was the writing of the Kanjur at Semtokha Dzong, where he demonstrated his skill by producing fourteen shog loka on regular days and sixteen shog loka on holy days.

His expertise caught the attention of Lama Druk Namgyal of Gombrag Gonpa, who commissioned Geshe to write the Kanjur for the Gonpa.

Subsequently, Geshe was called to Gyalsa Tewa in Thimphu by the government to participate in the writing of Kunga Gyaltshen’s sTon Cas. His exceptional work was highly praised, leading to him being bestowed with the title of "Geshe" and receiving a gift from the authorities. Geshe's reputation as a scholar and writer spread far and wide, solidifying his legacy as a respected figure in Bhutanese history.

A land dispute arose when someone encroached upon the Geshe's parental land. The matter was brought to the attention of the Desi, who found the litigant guilty and imprisoned him. However, the Geshe appealed to the authorities for the release of the individual.

During a deep sleep, the Geshe heard a voice calling out "Kawa Pel Tseg, Kawa Pel Tseg". Upon awakening, he was informed that he was indeed a "Kawa Pel Tseg", fulfilling the prophecy of Dro Dul Terdag Lingpa which stated, "Pel Tseg Trulpa Lho Nas Kunga Ming".

A local devotee requested the Geshe to preside over the reading of Kanjur at Bar Tsa. Despite minor disruptions, the program was successfully completed with the support of the Drungpa, Patrons, and even the Penlop. At the conclusion of the reading, Bar Tsa was renamed Thukten Lekshad Choling by His Holiness Shakya Rinchen, the ninth Je Khenpo of Bhutan.

 Although Dzongpon Nga Dargye predicted that the Geshe would become Daga Penlop, the Geshe expressed his lack of interest in worldly affairs. He stated that his only passion lay in practicing Dharma and leading a religious life.

Despite initially refusing the responsibility, the Geshe was eventually appointed as the lama of Chizhing Gonpa by the Desi. However, a rebellion ensued from his disciple Tenzin and his associates.

Upon arriving at Dagana, the Geshe was warmly welcomed by Daga Penlop Gya Ling and his staff extended their hospitality. Geshe took a three-day rest in Daga before his return journey. On his return trip, Daga Penlop and officials accompanied Geshe with horses and Zing Garps.

 Geshe witnessed the destruction of Trashi Chodzong by fire. However, he also noted that within years, Desi Zhidar (Sonam Lhundrup) had reconstructed the Dzong, restoring it to its former glory.

Geshe also had the opportunity to witness the first Anglo-Bhutanese war. He conducted rituals for the soldiers who had lost their lives during the conflict, praying for their welfare.

Reference

1. Biography of Pagar  Lama Ngawang Kunga Gyamtsho, TBRC.


Saturday, July 13, 2024

The Ashley Eden Mission to Bhutan 1863-64


 

The Ashley Eden Mission to Bhutan 1863-64    

Ashley Eden was a Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Ashley Eden was chosen to lead the British Mission to Bhutan. In 1861, British sent its Mission to Sikkim. Ashley Eden was sent to Sikkim as political officer and the Mission was successful. This could be the reason behind for appointing the Ashley Eden to lead the British Mission to Bhutan in 1863.

The Viceroy Lord Canning endorsed the proposal of sending the Mission to Bhutan. Lord Canning was replaced by Lord Elgin as next Viceroy. Lord Elgin also gave permission to send mission to Bhutan. Cecil Beadon was the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal.

The Mission members include Dr. Benjamin Simpson, Captain Henry Haversham Godwin-Austen, the second –in-command of the Mission, and Captain W.H. Lance. They brought Cheeboo Lama of Sikkim as an interpreter. Cheeboo Lama served as the agent of the Sikkimese Government at Darjeeling so long and he also acted as the adviser to the British on the affairs of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet.

The following instructions were given to the leader of the mission Ashley Eden to conduct with the Bhutanese counterpart while negotiating the agreement.

i)                    Ashley Eden should “explain clearly and distinctly but in a friendly and conciliatory spirit” why Ambaree Fallakata had been annexed by the British Government

ii)                  He should inform the Bhutan government that British had no intention to annex the Ambaree Fallakata as long as Bhutan Government complies with British request.

iii)                He should also demand that all captives kept in Bhutan and properties brought from British territory surrendered.

iv)                He should make the Bhutanese Government know the positions of the Cooch Behar and Sikkim which were the protectorate of the British.

v)                  He should attempt to get the draft treaty signed by the Bhutanese Government.

A Mission’s Route to Bhutan

Ashley Eden arrived at Darjeeling in November 1863. The mission waited almost a month to receive a welcome note from Bhutan Government. When there was no sign of communication, he wrote a letter again to Desi requesting Desi to order the Dalimkote Dzongpon to meet him or send suitable officers. He had also requested some porters to be arranged to carry his baggage. He further mentioned that if there is no response from Bhutan Government, he would report to his supreme Government that no arrangement was made by the Bhutan Government and it would consider that Bhutan breached the friendship. At that point, he heard that there was a struggle for power. The Punakha Dzonpon Darlung Tobgye revolted against the reigning Desi Nadzi Passang which I had already mentioned in the previous page.

While the power struggle was going in the Headquarters, a minor conflict was also taking place in the Dalimkote frontier. The Dalimkote Dzongpon was under the Paro Ponlop. But Dalimkote Dzongpon was in the party of the Punakha Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye. The Paro Ponlop Nyima Dorji who was in the Desi’s party sent another officer to replace the incumbent Dalimkote Dzongpon. When Dalimkote Dzongpon refused to surrender the Dalimkote Fort, a force was sent to remove him and captured the Fort for some months but in the end they withdrew when they came to know that the mission is to visit Dalimkote.

The mission reached Dalimkote on 12 January 1864. The Dzongpon of Dalimkote sent many messengers to Eden to explain that the delay of the mission or no information from Bhutan was not that Bhutan did not want to receive the mission but due the power struggle in the centre Government. Dzongpon told him wait patiently for reply and gave assurance that he would provide him every assistance in his power.

When asked permission from the Governor General whether or not to go ahead to Punakha, The Governor General ordered Eden to proceed to Punakha because they assumed that the new Desi Tshewang Sithub (reign: 1863-64) might welcome the mission to establish a good relationship with the British Indian Government. Moreover, Eden was encouraged by the Dalimkote Dzongpon to give him assistance to reach to Punakha.

Eden faced difficulties to get the porters. The porters were not willing to go to Bhutan. Many porters deserted the mission on the way till they reach Haa. However, Eden was helped by the Chebu Lama of Sikkim who was appointed as their interpreter.

On the way, they visited Dhamsang Fort or Dzong which was built by the fourth Desi Tenzin Rabgye in the 17th century. However, the Incharge of the Fort did not allow them to enter into the Fort by closing all the doors.

Then the mission reached Sibsoo. At Sibsoo, there was a residence of Dzongpon. However, to look after the Dzong, lower rank officer was appointed and kept there. Here also, as usual the Nyerpa (Store incharge) discouraged Eden to advance into Punakha. Eden had dilemma whether to move forward or to return back to their British territory. At last he decided to go ahead towards Punakha and they left Sibsoo.

 


                                                                   Ashley Eden, Secretary to Bengal Government                            

 

                                                       The Mission route followed by Ashley Eden

                                                        Note: The route is not to the scale


The place the mission reached was Sangbe. Eden called for the Dzongpon of the Sangbe. Eden was told that Dzongpon could not give him any help since there were no orders from the Desi. Dzongpon did not allow the villagers to help him also.

After leaving the Sangbe, they halted at Saybee. At Saybee, Mission met a Bhutanese man having a tumar on his mouth. Dr. Benjamin Simpson removed it. Here they met two Zingups carrying letters from the Desi. One of the letters contains the directives to be friendly to British Government and provide whatever helps the mission needs.  The second letter was full of threats. There was warning to Dzongpon of Dalimkote to risk his life, if he allowed the Mission to come to Bhutan and also to pay fine of 70 rupees each to the messengers sent to him. There was an instruction to the Dzongpon to never annoy the Eden and made him go. The last thing to do was to ask the mission to follow the Samtse route by way of Dungna.

When they reached at Haa, they were given a warm welcome by the Dzongpon. The Dzongpon supplied them fire wood, fodder and buckwheat flour. There was heavy snowfall and they were held up at Haa.

When the mission was about to move, the Dzongpon came down rushing and stopped Eden. Dzongpon told Eden that the mission cannot go without the prior permission from the Desi. The Dzongpon was angry but allowed Eden to move when presents were given.

When the mission was about to reach Paro, they were asked to halt by some Zingups. They were   told that Paro Penlop wants to welcome them in a grand manner. Therefore, they agreed to halt one day there and started to pitch the tents.  On the next day, they went to Paro. The arrangements for the mission’s reception were not up to the mark. There was no one to receive the mission and no one show the mission where to camp also. The places the mission chose to pitch tents were objected on the religious or cultural grounds. The members of the mission were kept standing in the sandy plain where strong wind is blowing up the valley. At last some high ranking officers came and showed the place to pitch the tents. These officers brought some oranges and Tibetan bread to them but there was no grand reception ceremony.

The following day, the Ex-Paro Penlop and his step son, the present Penlop, called upon the Chebu Lama who was an interpreter. The Penlops charged the Chebu Lama for bringing the British into Bhutan at first. The ex-penlop was Nyima Dorji and incumbent penlop was the Thinley Zangpo. The Penlops informed the memebrs of the Mission that there was strong order from the Desi not to allow the mission to proceed to Punakha. Moreover, Desi was powerless to make any decisions. Therefore, the Penlops requested to stay on Paro for four more days until the orders from the Desi come from Punakha. The Penlops promised that they would provide every facility for the comfort living of the mission members.

However, during the stay at Paro, the mission was treated far from friendly. They were told to stay within their camp and not to move out freely. The Paro Penlop’s retainers came to the mission’s camp and stole the belongings of the mission whatever they could.

Mr. Eden told to Penlop that he could not tolerate such ill treatments and informed the Penlop that he would either go to Punakha without the orders or would return to Darjeeling. At this point, the Penlop apologized that the ill treatments were caused by the ex-Penlop who had no power. He would not allow him to interfere thereafter. But later it was transpired that the statement of the incumbent Penlop was false.

However, Eden later on learnt that ex-penlop was still exercising his authority and the incumbent penlop was the puppet in the hands of step father. Eden found that the ex-penlop was attentive and civil in his actions. He came and sees the members of mission almost every day and provided much information about the Desi. The mission visited Paro Dzong, Ta Dzong and other important places of Paro valley and learnt much about the religion and culture of Bhutan during their sixteen days stay in Paro.

On 10th March 1864, the mission left Paro to Thimphu. The Mission reached Punakha on 15th March 1864. They sent several messengers to Desi to report their arrival but there was no response at all. Eden wrote that the composition of the Bhutanese council includes Dharma Raja, Desi, Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal, Thimphu Dzongpon Kawang Mangkhel, Punakha Dzongpon Drang Tashi, Wangdi Phodrang Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye, Kalyon, Zhung Dronyer, and Deb Zimpon.

 Eden observed that there was no Desi but the Bhutanese Council arranged one Lama as the Desi during the mission ‘s visit. But Bhutanese source says that Tshewang Sithub (second time) was the Desi. Eden had also seen that an eighteen-year-old boy was made to play the role of the Dharma Raja prior to that period. I wonder who could be the eighteen-year-old boy. The Zhabdrung Jigme Norbu had passed away in 1861. The reincarnation of Zhabdrung Jigme Norbu was Zhabdrung Jigme Chogyal but he was never enthroned as the Dharma Raja.

Eden had observed that among the members of the Council, Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal was the powerful. He was virtually the de facto leader of the country. Other members of the Council agreed to his proposal.

The members of the mission were summoned by the Council of the country to meet them at a house near the Dzong on 17th March 1864.[1] They passed through a crowd of retainers who were rude. These retainers threw many stones and wood to the members of the mission. The members of the mission were kept standing on the plain of the burning sun, while crowd of people jeered at them. This had happened before they meet the members of the Council. The members of the Council included Thimphu Dzongpon, Punakha Dzongpon, Zhung Dronyer, Kalyon, Deb Zimpon and Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal. Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal acted as the spokeperson of the Bhutan Government. Jigme Namgyal proposed that the meeting should conduct with the Chebu Lama in the view of the language problems. Ashley Eden readily accepted it. 

For about two days, Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal and Chebu Lama discussed the articles of the draft treaty. It seemed that Jigme Namgyal was objecting the stationing of the British agent at Thimphu and free trade between the two countries. But things turned out differently later on.

On 20th March, Eden and his team members were granted audience by the Dharma Raja and the Desi. After the interview with the Dharma Raja and Desi, the members of the mission were taken to another tent where the members of the Council were already seated. There was no space any one to sit there, members of the mission were asked to sit on the mats outside the tent in the sun.

The Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal spoke on behalf of the Dharma Raja and Desi. The discussion began with the Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal proposing that the Assam Duar should be restored to Bhutan should be added in the draft treaty.

Ashley Eden replied that he had no authority to do this. Then Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal infuriated and crumpled up the draft treaty and declared: “Then we will have war; you are no body; you have no authority from the Governor General. We didn’t want Ambaree Fallakata; I will have nothing more to do with you; go”.  

Mr. Eden expressed his disappointment to the other members of the Council saying that he had come all the way from Calcutta to Punakha with many difficulties on the way for the purpose of the friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries. Eden then returned to his camp. Realizing that there would be no fruitful result in staying at Punakha, Eden and his team prepared to leave Punakha and report to the Governor General the behaviors of the Bhutanese officials.

The members of the Council sent some messengers to the Mission’s camp and requested them to wait for some days. They told Eden that they approved the draft treaty and return of Assam Duars to Bhutan was not required as Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal demanded. The members of the Council gave assurance Eden that the meeting would be resolved amicably.

Eden agreed that they would postpone their departure, if the return of Assam Duars was excluded and Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal was not in the council. 

On 22nd March, Eden was invited to another meeting with the two members of the Council. They were Wangdi Phodrang Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye and Kalyon. Just after the seating with the council members was over, to the surprise of Eden, Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal walked in and took himself the centre seat. Then the draft treaty was read out excluding the Articles numbers 8 and 9.  Eden was told that if he agreed to this proposal, then rest of the Articles would be accepted.

On the 24th March, the draft treaty was ready to be signed. Another meeting was arranged where the tents were pitched near the Mission’s camp on the side of the river. Eden and his team members were made to wait for an hour while the members of the Council amused themselves by examining the arms of the escort.

At last, both the members of the parties were seated in the tent. There was friendly discussion in the beginning with the serving of tea and rice. But at the same time, many untoward things taken place which the Eden and his members faced difficult to bear them. When Eden expressed his views on modality of the signing of the treaty, no members of the Council listened to Eden. Instead they were talking and laughing themselves.

The Mission was taken to another tent which was surrounded by many crowds of people. During this meeting, the tone and manner of the Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal and Wangdi Phodrang Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye became offensive. Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal took a large piece of wet dough and rubbed Eden’s face and pulled Eden’s hair.  The Wangdi Phodrang Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye, after chewing the betel leaves and areca nut, took out from his mouth and offered to Dr. Simpson to take it. On the refusal to take it by Dr. Simpson, Wangdi Dzongpon Darlung Tobgye threw the leftover of the betel leaves and areca nut in the face of Dr. Simpson. After sufferings such treatments in the hands of Bhutanese officials, Eden and his team members discussed ways and means to return to Calcutta. Finally, they decided that Eden should sign the treaty as per the Bhutanese proposal and returned safely to Calcutta.

In the mean time, the Bhutanese officials demanded the presents sent to the Desi by the Governor General. Bhutanese officials blamed Eden for delay. Mr. Eden promised Bhutanese officials that the presents would be delivered as soon as Mission received supplies and fixed a day to leave Punakha. They agreed that they would meet on 27th March to sign the treaty and the Mission was allowed to leave the following day.

During the meeting on the 27th March, the Mission was treated with greater civility than the previous meetings. The members of the Mission were made to sit and traditional ceremonies were observed for the first time. The meeting was conducted inside the Dzong and addressed them courteously.  There were no insults.

But Eden and his team members noticed a Hindu National in the verandah of the room often consulted by Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal.

On 28th March, the members of the council came to the Mission’s camp and requested to enter the Mission’s camp but denied by Eden on fearing that the Bhutanese would steal everything they could. The Bhutanese officials also asked questions on the relative powers of the kings of Lahore and Delhi and the British on the basis of the briefing received from the man of Hindu National.

On 29th March, the Mission was taken to the tent to sign the treaty. Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal produced three copies of the treaty where no Bhutanese officials had signed the treaty. Eden was made to sign and seal two copies and made Chebu Lama to do the same. Eden after signing the treaty added the words “under compulsion” on each copy which the Bhutanese officials not aware of it.

Then the Mission was taken to the Desi and Dharma Raja to receive the scarf. As soon as the Mission left the meeting, Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal went off to Trongsa. Mission saw the Hindu National also accompanied Trongsa Penlop.

When the Mission was about to depart from their camp, the Bhutanese retainers came and stopped them from leaving the camp. They were told that they could not leave until the Wangdi Dzongpon show up, who had gone to Wangdi Phodrang. Eden refused to stay a day more. When the Bhutanese retainers became violent, Chebu lama explained that Eden was ill and if anything happen to Eden, then the Bhutanese would be held responsible.

The Mission left Punakha by moonlight and reached Paro on the 1st April. The Mission was received by the ex-Paro Penlop. They left Paro on 2nd April and reached at Darjeeling on 21st April.

Failure of the Mission

The Ashley Eden Mission was total failure. The Mission did not achieve any objectives which they wanted to fulfill. Now the question is who is responsible for the failure of the Mission. Was the British India or Bhutan? Or Both British India and Bhutan were equally responsible? British India blamed Bhutan for the failure of the mission. They put forward their points that they had sent the mission to settle the differences between the two Governments. But they said that the mission was insolently rejected by the Bhutanese Government. They further agrued that the members of the mission were grossly insulted in the public. So, they could not tolerate the ill treatments given to their members of the mission. Therefore, they sent their troops to attack Bhutan and taken the duars which belonged to Bhutan.

However, Bhutanese Government had its own reasons to tell the readers that Bhutanese Government never ever welcomed them to Bhutanese capiltal due to internal conflict. Bhutanese Government was in the opinion that British India pressed on forward to Punakha ignoring the letters sent.by the Bhutanese leader, which asked them not to come to Bhutan. In this regard, the Governor General of India, Sir John Lawrence expressed to Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of the State that Eden should have returned to Darjeeling from Paro.

The failure of the mission was attributed to the negotiations conducted by the Ashley Eden. Ashley Eden was instructed to negotiate the treaty with the presentation of the gifts to the Desi and members of the Council. But Eden negotiated the treaty without dilevery the gifts as the gifts arrived late. Eden was also instructed not to press hard any articles of the draft treaty, if Bhutanese leaders objected. Bhutanese objected the articles 8 & 9 of the draft treaty. Eden did not use his discretion power given to him. Even the Governor General was criticized that he did not have the clear picture of the mission’s problems to be reported to the Secretary of the State.

Further, C.U. Aitchison who was the under Secretary to the Bengal Government said that the Ashley Eden himself was responsible for the failure of the mission. He gave reasons that Eden did not send official report back to Calcutta when he faced difficulties but many British officers did not agree with C.U. Aitchison’s point. Eden did communicate back at Calcutta about the difficulties of the mission. But the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Mr. Cecil Beadon asked him to advance to interior of Bhutan. As a result, the Secreatary of the State pointed out that the Lieutenant Governor was at fault. Moreover, even one British officer wrote that the war in Bhutan is all Mr. Beadon’s doing.[2]

British India wanted to punish Bhutan for the gross ill treatment given to the members of the Mission by the Bhutanese officials in the public but British India disregarded the rations supplied to them by the Punkaha Dzongpon on their arrival at Punakha and also the reception of the Bhutanese horse to be used on their return journey by Desi of Bhutan.

Bhutan’s Refusal to welcome British Mission to Bhutan             

Bhutaese leaders were suspicious of the British India’s design of entering into the country, whether it is for political or trade purpose. The Desi of Bhutan did not allow any Britishers either to come to Bhutan or go to Tibet through Bhutan. Only Hindu or Muslim traders can travel to Bhutan or go to Tibet through Bhutan. This was as per the treaty signed in 1775 by George Bogle with the Desi of Bhutan. Bhutanese leaders suspected the British India’s motives of sending mission to Bhutan. For example, by signing a treaty in 1773, Cooch Behar became the protectorate of the British India. Sikkim also became the protectorate of the British India by the treaty of Tumlong. After driving away, the Burmese from Assam in 1826, many Rajas of the independent country in the North East Frontier were put under the British India’s control with the payment of tribute to British. When a Raja was not able to pay the tribute, British annexed the country. Sometimes, if Raja did not have future heir, his kindom was annexed and put under the administration of the Bengal Government. So, it was wise action on the part of the Bhutanese leaders for not allowing the British mission to enter into country.

Another reason for not allowing the foreign mission to enter into the country was to prevent the coming of the Christianity. We know during the time of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, who was the founder of Bhutan; two Jesuit priests Father Estevao Cacella and Father Joao Cabral came to Bhutan and met Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal.

The British Baptist Missionery came to Bengal. From their headquarters at Serampore in Bengal, the missionery was being sent to North East frontier.  In the meantime, American Baptist Missionery also came to Assam. The Missionery attempted to come to Bhutan. For instance, Rev. W. Robinson the Baptist Missioner failed to get permission to reside and preach in the Bhutan.[3]  Willliam Robison made four attempts to set up a mission on the borders of Bhutan between 1808 and 1811.[4] For this matter, Bray quoted William Carey saying, “All these nations are afraid that the English have design to subjugate them, as they have Bengal”. Further more; Christianity very often invaded the new territory hand-in-hand with military. This was the case in Assam.[5] K.Labh (1974) also shared his views about the same issue in the following statement:

“One of the main reasons why the Bhutanese authorities were reluctant to grant permission to the Europeans to visit their country was their resentment of the proselytising activities of the missionaries. They felt that once they started permitting the Europearls to enter Bhutan, it would be difficult later on to keep missionaries out of their country”.                                                                                                                    

Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal and Padsha Raja

Padsha Raja was the Peshwa Raja Nana Sahib of India. He was one of the leaders of the Indian Mutiny 1857-58 which was considered as the first independent war of India.  After the war, he escaped to Bhutan through Nepal.  Padsha Raja stayed with Jigme Namgyal at Trongsa Dzong. Since then Pasha Raja acted as the advisor to Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal. It was suspected that Padsha Raja ill advised Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal against the British India. That was why; Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal protested the British India’s draft treaty.[6]

At Punakha Dzong, Ashley Eden and his team also saw an Indian native in Bhutanese dress walking here and there, when they were waiting for the Desi of Bhutan. The Indian gentleman was none other than the Padsha Raja as he was known in Bhutan.

Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal was already informed that a gentle man from India would come to Trongsa and he should be treated well by his root lama Jangchub Tsundru. Padsha Raja also later accompanied Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal to Dewangiri and fought a war with British India.[7]

 



[1] The truth about Bootan

[2] Majumdar, (1984)

[3] Bray (..)

[4] Sword (1935)

[5] Tshering Tashi (2013)

[6] Tshewang (1994)




Tuesday, June 18, 2024

Guru Rinpoche’s Prophecy

 

Guru Rinpoche’s Prophecy

Guru Rinpoche informed Tibetans that he would leave Tibet for the land of Rakshas. Mune Tsenpo being the young king at the time, saddened by the news of Guru Rinpoche leaving Tibet, Mune Tsenpo requested Guru Rinpoche to stay back at Tibet. Mune Tsenpo also asked questions to Guru Rinpoche.

In answer to Mune Tsenpo’s questions, Guru Rinpoche spoke the following Stanzas.

 

བསམ་ཡས་ལྷ་ཁང་ཁོག་ཅིང་ལྷམ་པ་དང་།                  མཐའ་འདུལ་གཙུག་ལག་ཕལ་ཆེར་འདྲུལ་ཞིང་ཞིག།       

ང་ཡི་སྤྲུལ་པ་ལྷོ་ཡི་ཕྱོགས་སུ་འབྱུང་།        རྟེན་འབྲེལ་འགྲིགས་ན་བསྟན་པའི་སྲོག་ཤིང་ཚུགས།                 

གནམ་དཀར་རྩེ་ལ་དགོན་གཞེས་ཆེ་བར་འབྱུང་།   སྟག་ཚང་བྲག་ལ་ཡིག་དྲུག་ཆོས་སྒྲ་ཤར།

ང་ཡི་སྤྲུལ་པ་གཏུམ་པོའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་འབྱུང་།        རྟེལ་འབྲེལ་འགྲིགས་ན་ལྷོ་ཕྱོགས་ཡུན་དུ་བདེ།

Guru Rinpoche spoke the above stanzas during the 8th century CE. But this Guru Rinpoche’s prophecy was revealed by Terton Drukdra Dorji in the 18th century CE.

Source: Terton Drukdra Dorji’s gSung from TBRC.


Translation:

Samye Monastery's halls will be empty and dilapidated, and most of the boundary-taming temples will crumble and decay.
My emanation will appear in the southern direction. If circumstances align, the life-tree of the doctrine will be established.
At Namkar Tse, a great monastic seat will emerge. At Taktsang Rock, the six-syllable mantra's Dharma sound will resound.
My emanation will appear as a fierce yogi. If circumstances align, the south will enjoy long-lasting happiness.

Note: Translated using Monlam ai

The Roles of Trongsa Penlop Ugyen Wangchuck in the Conflict between the British Raj and Tibet in 1888

  The Roles of Trongsa Penlop Ugyen Wangchuck in the Conflict between the British Raj and Tibet in 1888 We know Trongsa Penlop Ugyen Wangc...