The Delivery of Guns to British India at Drangme Zam below the Shalikhar Dzong.

 

The Delivery of Guns to British India at Drangme Zam below the Shalikhar Dzong.

In accordance with the agreement signed between British and Bhutan, the guns were supposed to return by 10 January 1866. But Trongsa Penlop Jigme Namgyal refused to accept the terms of peace signed by Desi. Jigme Namgyal wanted to negotiate separately with British which were declined by the British India Government.

Meanwhile, on January 19th, 1866, Major General Frazer Tytler reported to Government that Trongsa Penlop refused to give the guns up and openly defied the British. As a result, orders were issued for an advance to be made against Trongsa Penlop. General Tytler was not willing to act provided he was given a large force. General Tytler resigned when Government appointed Colonel Richardson to command the expedition. But Lady MacGregor writes that Government decided to send the column to Trongsa under the command of Colonel Richardson because the Government was hurried to send the column to Trongsa as General Tytler’s plan of operations was delay considerably.

Colonel Richardson proceeded to Trongsa from Dewangiri on 4th February, 1866. The Colonel Richardson’s forces included: 3 Companies of the 26th Native Infantry, and 1Company of Sappers and Miners.

On 5th, Colonel Richardson received a letter from the Lama of Yongla Gonpa saying some of the Dzongpons were preparing to fight and that they may destroy the bridge over the river Drangme, which was then known as “Drangme Zam” that lies below the Shalikar Dzong on the way to Zhongar. Colonel Richardson made a quick dash to seize the bridge on 6th February. On arrival near the Shalikhar Dzong, they were attacked by Bhutanese, where their two men wounded. They pushed down to Drangme Zam without retaliation the Bhutanese ambush because their main intention was to take control of the Drangme Zam. To their surprise, the bridge was found intact on their arrival. However, on 23rd February, 1866, the guns were handed over to Colonel Richardson. After receiving the guns, Colonel Richardson immediately returned to Dewangiri.

Mr. Grey was appointed as a political officer in the right column during the war time. So he continued to serve in the same capacity when British force made an advance to Trongsa from Dewangiri. British force reached at Drangme Zam on 7th February. They halted there from 8th to 22nd February. They had provisions for three days only. They went to Salikhar to collect some provisions. On 13th February, Mr. Grey visited Yongla lam. The Lam welcomed him and treated him well. Through Lama, Mr. Grey communicated to Desi of Bhutan. On 16th, Desi wrote to Grey informing him that he had sent men to bring guns. Moreover, on 8th February, Lama had sent message to Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal that Britsh force had arrived at Drangme Zam and urging to surrender the guns.

After waiting and negotiating some days, finally, the guns were delivered to British forces at Drangme Zam on 22nd February. Along with two guns, seventy two British soldiers who were captured during war time by Bhutanese were released).  But there was nothing mentioned about the Bhutanese soldiers who were in the hand of British.

 On 26th February, Mr. Grey returned to Dewangiri but the forces came back on 3rd March 1866.  This terminated the conflict between Bhutan and British India.

This British report does not tally with the beliefs of the local people which state that the Shalikhar Dzong was destroyed by the British forces on their way to Trongsa to get the guns.        

The British Political officer and commander in-chief were given strict orders not to harm the common Bhutanese people. They were instructed to bring back the guns. They were told to burn down the Dzong where Trongsa Ponlop Jigme Namgyal live, in case he did not give up the guns and if they were to go to Trongsa. There is a written letter from the Viceroy to Mr. Grey which is worth sharing:

 

“CALCUTTA 3rd February 1866.

“DEAR MR. GREY,

In the approaching expedition against Tongso, you must be careful to communicate

fully and freely with Colonel Richardson and on all military points be guided by his judgment.

“It is very desirable that we should reach Tongso, and punish the chief if he does not send the guns. I am in great hopes that when he hears that the force has advanced, or at any rate has proceeded some marches on the way towards him, he will submit and restore the guns. Should he do so, the objects of the expedition will be accomplished and the force should fall back. “But however anxious I am to accomplish these objects, you must understand that I am still more desirous of avoiding disaster. If, therefore, supplies should fail, or carriage fall short, or the difficulties of the way prove, in the judgment of Colonel Richardson, insurmountable, or even greater than it may appear expedient to encounter, then it will rest with that officer to give up the expedition. “I do not apprehend much from the efforts of the Bhutias, but the route is long and difficult, and supplies for the troops are of primary importance. Unless these are secured, it will not be safe to advance.

“It will be a great point to establish such depots as may be considered necessary, in strong positions where water is available, and to throw up a sufficient defence against sudden attack.

"You are at liberty to spend any money which may be required for any purpose connected with the expedition, and when good information is furnished or even risk run in attempting to procure it, pay liberally. Take sufficient money with you. Keep a good lookout, see that proper discipline is enforced, and protect the peaceable inhabitants of the country.

"You may quite reckon on my support and countenance. “Should the force reach Tongso and fail to recover the guns, blow up the chief fort. I anticipate that he will not stand an attack, but will retreat into the interior. In that case the object will be to damage his power and prestige as much as possible. Don't remain at Tongso longer than is prudent. "If the Bhutan Government or any of their people show a disposition to help in coercing the Tongso, encourage them to do so, but don't pay them any money, and take suit able precautions against treachery without appearing to distrust them more than is necessary.” If the Tongso Penlo comes in, or gives up the guns,

treat him and his people courteously, but do not pay them any money. I have no objection to his receiving eventually any portion of the sum we shall pay annually to the Bhutan Government-either direct or through them, but this point must be settled by the Government of India in communication with the Deb and Dharm Rajas. And in no case am I willing to pay the Tongso Penlo money either for, or immediately after the surrender of the guns. On any doubtful

point, write and telegraph for orders. Don't pay the Tongso Penlo any money without such orders. -

Yours sincerely,                                                                                   

JOHN LAWRENCE."

Reference

1) Grey, Colonel L.J.H. 1912. Tales of our Grandfather, India since 1856, Printed by BAI.LANTYNE, HANSON &. CO., At the Ballantyne Press, Edinburgh.

2) MacGregor, Lady. (..). The Life and Opinions of Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, (Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013).